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Moore v. State of Nevada, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 35 (May 17, 2018)1
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: POSTCONVICTION PETITIONS
Summary
The Court determined that the district court did not err when it denied Moore’s
procedurally barred postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus without an evidentiary
hearing to determine if Moore could overcome the procedural bars.
Background
Moore was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.2 One witness against
Moore, Angela Saldana, worked with law enforcement and her uncle to obtain information about
the murders. The parties knew about this relationship during the trial. Moore directly appealed his
conviction and the court issued a remittitur.
Moore sought postconviction relief in multiple actions. On September 19, 2013, more than
a year after remittitur, Moore filed a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which is
the subject of the present controversy. The State of Nevada moved to dismiss Moore’s petition and
plead laches, or prejudice to the State in accordance with NRS 34.800(2).3
Moore argued that 1) the State unlawfully withheld evidence that Saldana’s participation
was involuntary and she was fed information from police records for her testimony, 2) Moore had
ineffective counsel throughout his prior postconviction petition, and 3) Moore is innocent of the
death penalty.
Discussion
Moore’s petition was untimely filed due to his filing over a year after remittitur was issued
on his direct appeal,4 and was successive due to his filing for postconviction relief prior to the
present petition.5 Therefore, Moore’s petition must be dismissed unless he proves good cause for
failing to timely file the petition and that he was prejudiced in earlier petition adjudications.6
Because the State plead laches, there is a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the State that
Moore had to overcome.7
Brady v. Maryland
Moore claims that the State withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. 8 The
petitioner must prove that “the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; the evidence was
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withheld by the state, either intentionally or inadvertently; and prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence
was material.”9
First, the Court points out that Moore’s Brady claim was pled insufficiently. Moore fails
to identify specific information that the State was withholding and why he did not raise the claim
sooner. Moore cannot force the district court to hold an evidentiary trial by withholding
information about his claim.10
Second, the Court determined that Moore’s Brady claim is unfounded. If proved, Moore’s
assertion that Saldana’s testimony was coerced would fulfill the first two Brady elements:
favorable to Moore and withheld by the State.11 However, Moore failed to prove that the testimony
would be material. Moore failed to prove that Saldana’s testimony was needed to corroborate
accomplice testimony.12 The other witnesses were not accomplices,13 and Saldana’s testimony
would still be admissible even if it was impeached. Additionally, Moore failed to prove that the
omitted evidence impeaching Saldana would create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury in
a way that would have changed Moore’s conviction or sentencing.14
Ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel
A petitioner sentenced to death is entitled to effective assistance of counsel for his first
postconviction proceeding.15 Ineffective assistance can excuse procedural bars to further
postconviction proceedings.16
Mitigating evidence regarding Moore’s upbringing
Moore failed to demonstrate that counsel should have uncovered character witnesses in his
favor when he himself fails to identify such witnesses in his brief.17 Further, Moore failed to
demonstrate prejudice as the jury heard substantially similar testimony at trial.18
Mitigating evidence in the form of expert testimony
Moore failed to demonstrate that counsel should have presented expert testimony regarding
his mental health,19 or that such evidence would have done more than “add[] an expert’s gloss” to
the testimony presented.20
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Additional expert testimony
Moore failed to demonstrate that counsel should have presented an expert witness to
question the connection between the guns in evidence and the bullet casings found at the scene, or
how Moore’s drug use could have undermined the mens rea requirement for first-degree murder
because Moore himself failed to present such evidence.
Other ineffective-assistance claims
Moore failed to demonstrate that 1) the prosecutors engaged in misconduct, 2) a juror did
not speak English, or 3) the trial court failed to change venue because such claims could have been
raised on direct appeal and were thus waived at the postconviction stage. Moore additionally failed
to prove good cause and prejudice to overcome that bar because the failure of the district court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing should have been raised on an appeal to that petition.21
Actual innocence
A person is “actually innocent” of the death penalty if the record doesn’t support such a
penalty. Actual innocence means no rational juror could have found for the death penalty.22 A
showing of actual innocence excuses the procedural bar of failure to show good cause.23
The Court has previously rejected the argument that the aggravating circumstance that “the
murder was committed by a person who knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one
person” is unconstitutional.24 Moore gave no reason to reconsider that decision. Additionally, there
were more aggravating circumstances for which a jury to find for the death penalty.
The Court’s failure to reweigh the aggravating circumstances analysis after the prior appeal
is an argument for legal innocence, which cannot support a finding of actual innocence.25
Procedurally barred claims
The court need not consider under a cumulative-error theory every claim previously raised
and rejected,26 and Moore fails to identify those claims.
Conclusion
Moore failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by denying his procedurally barred
postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing.
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